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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the realm of large scale infrastructure projects that span the 
international boundaries of the United States, the law presently fails to 
openly designate a body of government that bears the approval power. In 
the absence of definitive legislation in the area, the executive exercise of 
this approval power at the presidential level likely falls within the bounds 
of constitutional permissibility that is established by congressional 
acquiescence. However, Congress retains the unimpeachable power to 
dictate change by legislation, and indeed it should do so in order to 
establish a consistent and transparent approval regime, while also 
ensuring adequate environmental review.  
 The permissibility of the current executive exercise of the approval 
power and the desirability of legislative intervention in this area are 
evidenced in the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. 
A. History of the Keystone Pipeline Project 
 Before determining whether to provide a permit for construction of 
the Keystone pipeline, on November 10, 2011, the Obama administration 
announced that it would undertake further environmental review of the 
proposed project in light of unified environmental opposition. The fate of 
the proposed pipeline will likely define President Obama’s legacy on 
environmental policy and stewardship.  
 The practical effect of this announcement was to defer the 
permitting decision beyond the 2012 presidential election and therefore 
to place the issue outside the immediate political consciousness of 
Americans. In short, President Obama punted on the most important 
environmental decision yet to come across his desk. The Republican 
congressional leadership responded by attaching a provision to a payroll 
tax cut and unemployment benefits extension bill that required the 
President to issue a decision on the Keystone XL permit application 
within sixty days of the bill’s passage. President Obama signed that bill 
into law as Congress went into holiday recess on December 23, 2011.1 
He then obliged by denying the permit application on January 18, 2012, 
stating that the law’s restriction did not allow the necessary time to 
complete further environmental review.2 On February 27, 2012, the 
pipeline builder announced its intention to submit a revised application 
for a presidential permit to authorize the construction of the Keystone 
                                                 
1. Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-78, Title V, 125 Stat. 1279, 
1289-91 (2011).  
2. Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline, Office of the Press Secretary, The 
White House (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/18/statem ent-president-keystone-xl-pipeline. 
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XL pipeline.3 With President Obama’s re-election now secured and John 
Kerry likely to be confirmed by his Senate colleagues to the Cabinet post 
soon to be vacated by Hillary Rodham Clinton, the renewed matter of the 
Keystone XL pipeline appears poised to come before Mr. Kerry’s State 
Department and Mr. Obama’s White House in 2013. 
 The Keystone Pipeline System is a network of pipelines designed 
for the delivery of heavy synthetic crude oil from the tar sands of 
northeastern Alberta into the United States. While the tar sands hold 
hydrocarbon resources of enormous value, so-called “tar sands oil” has 
been decried by environmentalists because of the large-scale surface 
destruction that its extraction entails and because this extraction is energy 
intensive and therefore generates high levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions.4 This source consequently yields a lower net energy return 
than conventional sources of crude oil.  
 After a series of corporate acquisitions, the project is now solely 
owned by the TransCanada Corporation. TransCanada has designated the 
development of the Keystone Pipeline System into four phases, two of 
which are now operational and two of which are currently in progress. 
Phase I comprises the original Keystone Pipeline, which stretches 2,147 
miles from Hardisty, Alberta, through the Canadian provinces of 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba before entering the United States and 
traversing the Dakotas to arrive at Steele City, Nebraska.5 From there the 
pipeline cuts through the northeast corner of Kansas and crosses the 
breadth of Missouri to reach refineries at Wood River and Patoka, 
Illinois. Because this pipeline crosses the international frontier with 
Canada to enter the United States, it requires, under Executive Order No. 
13,337, the grant of a presidential permit.6 Such a permit was granted on 
March 17, 2008,7 and the pipeline commenced operation in June 2010.8 
Phase II of the Keystone Pipeline System, the so-called “Cushing 
Extension,” entails a simple three-hundred-mile extension from Steele 
                                                 
3. John M. Broder, TransCanada Renewing Request to Build Keystone Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2012, at A13. 
4. See Robert Kunzig, The Canadian Oil Boom, NAT’L GEOG. MAG., Mar. 2009, available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/03/canadian-oil-sands/kunzig-text. 
5. See Keystone XL Pipeline – Overall Route Map, TRANSCANADA CORP., http://keystone-
xl.com/keystone-xl-pipeline-overall-route-map/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
6. Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (Apr. 30, 2004). 
7. State Department Grants Keystone Permit; Work to Start in Q2, DOWNSTREAM TODAY, 
Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=9385. 
8. Press Release, TransCanada Corporation, Keystone Pipeline Starts Deliveries to U.S. 
Midwest (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.transcanada.com/5407.html. 
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City, Nebraska, to the oil transit juncture at Cushing, Oklahoma. This 
extension became operational in February 2011.9 
 Phases III and IV constitute the ambitious “Gulf Coast Expansion,” 
which is the subject of the current Keystone XL controversy. Phase III  
will include an extension of the pipeline from Cushing, Oklahoma, to 
America’s greatest concentration of refining capacity on the Gulf Coast,  
near Houston and Port Arthur, Texas.10 On March 22, 2012, Barack 
Obama stood in the Stillwater Pipe Yard at Cushing and stated the 
intention of his administration to “fast-track” the construction of this 
segment of the Keystone pipeline network.11 Phase IV includes a 
doubling of TransCanada’s cross-border capacity by the construction of 
another pipeline from the source at Hardisty, Alberta, to the terminal at 
Steele City, Nebraska.12 This pipeline would, as currently proposed, enter 
the state of Montana from the Canadian province of Saskatchewan and 
cross into the northwestern corner of South Dakota. The pipeline would 
proceed in a southeastern direction across South Dakota and through 
Nebraska’s sensitive Sand Hills region and the massive Ogallala Aquifer 
en route to Steele City.13 Phase IV of the pipeline system, with its 
proposed border crossing from Saskatchewan into Montana, is the 
subject of the current controversy. 
B. The Cross-Border Pipeline Permitting Process 
 Executive Order 13,337 does not require the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS). However the State Department’s 
implementing policies indicate that, in the event of a presidential permit, 
the department will undertake to perform an EIS in conformity with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).14 The State 
Department favored the granting of a presidential permit for the 
Keystone XL pipeline in its final environmental impact statement (FEIS) 
                                                 
9. Press Release, TransCanada Corporation, Keystone’s Cushing Extension Begins Deliveries 
to Oklahoma (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.transcanada.com/5641.html. 
10. Press Release, TransCanada Corporation, Keystone Gulf Coast Expansion Approved (Mar. 
11, 2010), available at http://www.transcanada.com/5109.html. 
11. Obama Fast-Tracks Part of Keystone XL Pipeline, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0322/Obama-fast-tracks-part-of-Keystone-XL-
pipeline-video (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
12. Art Hovey, TransCanada Proposes Second Oil Pipeline, LINCOLN J. STAR, Jun. 
12, 2008, http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=11336&AspxAutoDetectCooki
eSupport=1; see Keystone XL Pipeline – Overall Route Map, supra note 5. 
13. Keystone XL Pipeline – Overall Route Map, supra note 5. 
14. Fact Sheet: Applying for Presidential Permits for Border Crossing Facilities (Canada), 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF W. HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS , http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/20
09/114990.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
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of August 26, 2011.15 However it was in response to allegations of 
inadequacy of the FEIS that the Obama administration gave the order for 
further environmental review in November of 2011.16 This action 
prompted the Republican-controlled Congress to attach the sixty-day 
requirement to the then-pending legislation, which in turn prompted the 
Obama administration to deny  the permit application in January 2012.17 
 Under the authority of Executive Order 13,337 dating from the 
presidency of Lyndon Johnson and under color of the “inherent foreign 
affairs powers” that have long been settled to vest in the presidency, the 
executive has delegated to the State Department the duty of granting or 
refusing permits for certain infrastructure projects that would traverse the 
international boundaries of the United States.18 Amongst these are 
proposals for oil pipelines.19 The Supreme Court of the United States 
recognizes the privilege of the President to enter into “executive 
agreements” or “executive settlements” with foreign sovereign powers 
whose terms may alter the rights and remedies of American citizens by 
simple virtue of presidential supremacy in the realm of foreign affairs. 
However, the “inherent foreign affairs powers” do not appear to 
contemplate an executive privilege to enter into similarly binding 
arrangements with private foreign parties. Furthermore, insofar as the 
presidential permit power has historically been exercised over certain 
facilities entering into the United States, the presidential power is limited 
to the approval or disapproval of the physical border crossing itself. 
Finally, federal courts are divided as to whether an FEIS issued in the 
course of a presidential permitting constitutes a final agency action or is 
a presidential action immune from judicial review as within the “inherent 
foreign affairs powers” of the President. 
 The Keystone XL pipeline and the Obama administration’s denial 
of a presidential permit prompted a flurry of legislative activity on 
Capitol Hill. Senator Hoeven of North Dakota introduced Senate Bill 
2041 on January 31, 2012 with bi-partisan support.20 This bill allows 
                                                 
15. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED 
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT 3.15 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182070.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Keystone XL Project FEIS]; 
see also Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Keystone XL Project; Public 
Meetings, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,525 (Aug. 26, 2011). 
16. John M. Broder & Dan Frosch, U.S. Delays Decision on Pipeline Until After Election, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at A1. 
17. Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-78, Title V, 125 Stat. 1279, 
1289-91 (2011); Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 2. 
18. Exec. Order No. 13,337, supra note 6. 
19. Pub. L. No. 112-78 at § 2(a)(i). 
20. S. 2041, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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Congress to declare that the State Department’s FEIS of August 2011,21 
which analyzes the proposed pipeline, shall be accepted,22 thereby 
superseding and effectively terminating the Obama administration’s 
renewed environmental inquiry. Furthermore, this bill explicitly 
authorizes TransCanada to proceed in its construction of the pipeline,23 
thereby superseding the presidential permitting process of Executive 
Order 13,337. The bill also proposes to severely restrict the scope of any 
judicial review of legal questions relating to the authorization or 
construction of the pipeline.24 The GovTrack archive reveals that the bill 
died in Committee before the close of the previous session of Congress.25 
 Regardless of the fate of Senate Bill 2041, the bill is useful in 
framing a constitutional question as to the proper roles of the executive 
and the legislative branches. To begin, this article will evaluate a similar 
instance of congressional intervention into the authorization of a 
different oil pipeline project during an earlier age of energy anxiety. In 
examining the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, it 
emerges that Congress may intervene at its pleasure to alter the course of 
environmental review of a particular project. Congress may also elect to 
limit the scope of judicial review of such projects without offending the 
due process and equal protection rights of affected citizens. 
 However, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and its 
treatment in the courts only begins the inquiry. Because the Keystone XL 
pipeline would enter the United States across an international boundary, 
this pipeline implicates the “inherent foreign affairs powers” of the 
President and thereby the venerated separation of powers principles that 
are deeply embedded in our Constitution. The text of Executive Order 
No. 13,337, the instrument that delegates permit-granting power to the 
State Department, must be briefly examined, along with the most recent 
judicial treatment of such process as an executive privilege in the field of 
foreign affairs. The history and evolution of the “inherent foreign affairs 
powers” of the President will then be considered in order to discern their 
outermost boundaries. The jurisprudence of the “inherent foreign affairs 
powers” will then be applied to the exercise of such power under 
Executive Order No. 13,337 in the case of the Keystone XL permit 
application. This application shows that while the precise contours of the 
“inherent foreign affairs powers” remain nebulous, the exercise of the 
                                                 
21. Proposed Keystone XL Project FEIS, supra note 15. 
22. S. 2041 at § 1(a)(2). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at § 1(f). 
25. Overview, S. 2041 (112th): A bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline project and provide 
for environmental protection and government oversight, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congre
ss/bills/112/s2041#overview (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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presidential permit authority as to the Keystone XL pipeline likely falls 
within the bounds established by precedent and previously acquiesced in 
by Congress. 
 Even where Congress has previously acquiesced in the power of the 
President, Congress remains free to abrogate that earlier acquiescence. 
Congress is vested of the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations” and this clause grants to Congress a free hand in the area of 
cross-border infrastructure permitting. 26 After establishing that Congress 
is largely at will to do as it pleases, this article will conclude with a call 
for modest legislative action by which Congress might exercise its power 
to ensure a consistent and transparent permit processing regime for cross-
border facilities. This action would end legal uncertainty in this area and 
ensure proper environmental and judicial review of proposed cross-
border facilities moving forward into the future.  
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE SCOPE OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 Senate Bill 2041 contains provisions that demand an inquiry into 
the proper roles of the Executive and of Congress in granting permits for 
cross-border infrastructure projects such as the Keystone XL pipeline. 
The bill directs that “[t]he final environmental impact statement issued 
by the Department of State on August 26, 2011, shall be considered to 
satisfy all requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969”27 and that “any action taken [to implement the purpose of the Bill] 
shall not constitute a major Federal action under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.”28 In its final portion, the Bill 
provides that actions taken to effectuate the purpose of the Bill “shall 
only be subject to judicial review on direct appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”29 Senate Bill 
2041 therefore raises two important threshold legal questions: first, is it 
within the power of Congress to mandate approval of a particular 
infrastructure project and in so doing to supersede the prior requirements 
of NEPA as to that project, and second, is it within the power of 
Congress to so severely restrict the scope of judicial review?   
 In answering these questions, it is useful to consider the legal 
wrangling that surrounded an equally controversial pipeline project of 
similarly vast proportions in an earlier time of energy insecurity.  
                                                 
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
27. S. 2041 at § 1(b)(1). 
28. Id. at § 1(e)(1). 
29. Id. at § 1(f). 
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A. The Lesson of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 
 Large reserves of crude oil were discovered on Alaska’s North 
Slope near Prudhoe Bay in 1969. In one of history’s ironies, the National 
Environmental Policy Act30 of that same year was signed into law on 
January 1, 1970, imposing rigorous requirements of environmental 
review upon such large-scale infrastructure projects as the proposed 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline was to be built from 
the North Slope to the ice-free port at Valdez with crude oil then be 
delivered via tanker ship to terminals on the western coast of the United 
States.31 
 While environmental groups and others brought legal actions 
alleging inadequate environmental review, only one lawsuit threatened to 
halt the mighty pipeline. That lawsuit simply alleged that the Secretary of 
Interior overstepped his statutory grant of authority in issuing certain 
right-of-way permits for the construction of the pipeline.32 On February 
9, 1972, engaging in a strict exercise of statutory interpretation, the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed a district court ruling and issued an injunction against the 
issuance of such permits.33 
 Congress reacted with force. After the brief Yom Kippur War of 
October 1973 and the attendant reductions in oil output by Middle 
Eastern producers drove energy prices to staggering levels, Congress 
acted on November 16, 1973, to enact the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act (TAPAA).34 In the legislation, Congress unabashedly 
declared its goal to “authorize[] and direct[]” that “the trans-Alaska oil 
pipeline be constructed promptly without further administrative or 
judicial delay or impediment.”35 The Act approved of and accepted the 
FEIS that the Department of the Interior issued the previous year and 
offered that “[t]he route of the pipeline may be modified by the Secretary 
to provide during construction greater environmental protection.”36 The 
Act further provided that authorizations for the pipeline system “shall not 
be subject to judicial review under any law except that claims alleging 
the invalidity [of the Act] may be brought within sixty days following its 
                                                 
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012). 
31. For an excellent overview of the economic, political, social, and environmental context in 
which the contentious debate regarding the Trans-Alaska Pipeline transpired, see JAMES P. ROSCOW, 
800 MILES TO VALDEZ: THE BUILDING OF THE ALASKA PIPELINE (1977). 
32. Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 4 ERC 1467 (D.D.C. 1972). 
33. Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
34. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, §§ 201-206, 87 Stat. 576 
(1973). 
35. Id. at § 203(a). 
36. Id. at § 203(b). 
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enactment,” and that “claims alleging that an action will deny rights 
under the Constitution . . . may be brought within sixty days following 
the date of such action.”37 Lastly, the Act declared that review of any 
order of a district court as to such a claim “may be had only upon direct 
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.”38 
B. Congressional Action to Limit the Scope of Environmental and Judi-
cial Review is Constitutionally Permissible 
 At the time Congress enacted TAPAA, President Nixon had 
recently signed NEPA into law, and the true impact it would bear on the 
environmental policy of the United States government remained highly 
uncertain. Environmental advocates were concerned at the frontal assault 
to the new legislation posed by TAPAA. Many perceived TAPAA to be 
nothing less than an existential threat to the legislation they had strived to 
secure.39 Nonetheless, as a simple matter of constitutionally vested 
legislative power, it is well settled that Congress is within its right to 
exempt a particular project from NEPA’s safeguards of environmental 
review by tailored and targeted legislation. While this issue was not 
directly presented, the Supreme Court acknowledged this right in Alyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y.40 The Court noted TAPAA’s 
declaration—that no further action under NEPA was necessary for the 
construction of the pipeline—and found “the merits of the litigation 
effectively terminated by this legislation.”41 While it may seem offensive 
that a politically driven Congress may intervene to determine the 
applicability of environmental safeguards that might ideally be applied 
uniformly and dispassionately, this is the inevitable result. Because 
NEPA, and all federal environmental controls, ultimately stem from 
Congress, it necessarily follows that Congress may alter or amend the 
applicability of such laws and regulations by subsequent legislation. 
 Similarly, the Supreme Court has long recognized the power of 
Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This power is 
generally accepted to derive from Article III of the Constitution, which 
provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”42 It logically follows that if Congress 
is vested of the power to “ordain and establish” the trial and intermediate 
                                                 
37. Id. at § 203(d). 
38. Id. 
39. See ROSCOW, supra note 31, at 10. 
40. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
41. Id. at 245. 
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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appellate courts, then it is necessarily vested of the power to designate 
their subject matter jurisdiction. As early as 1856, the Supreme Court 
wrote that “there are matters, involving public rights, which may be 
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on 
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which 
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of 
the United States, as it may deem proper.”43 
 Because of the accepted congressional power to override NEPA 
requirements and to limit the scope of federal court jurisdiction, where 
the legislature authorizes a particular project, such authorization is likely 
to withstand a constitutional challenge unless it can be shown that the 
legislation’s restrictions offend fundamental notions of due process or 
equal protection. The limited case law associated with the TAPAA’s 
restriction of judicial review reveals that such is likely not the case. In 
Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit noted that “[t]he protections of the Due 
Process Clause are extended only when a ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest 
has been threatened. But generalized environmental concerns do not 
constitute a property or liberty interest.”44 The Supreme Court denied a 
petition for certiorari in the Izaak Walton case.45 In Stop H-3 Ass’n v. 
Dole, a citizens’ group brought an equal protection challenge to a 
congressional authorization of a federal highway project in Hawaii.46 In 
rejecting the challenge, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote “it is 
simply not true that Congress may not create exemptions from generally 
applicable statutes in order to authorize state-specific projects.”47 
 In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline and the proposed 
authorization of that project in Senate Bill 2041, the case for an equal 
protection challenge is weaker still. Unlike the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
and the Hawaii highway authorization, the Keystone XL pipeline is not a 
“state-specific project,” and as such there is no argument that the 
authorization would present a form of discrimination against the citizens 
of a particular state. 
 Senate Bill 2041 is distinct from TAPAA because it limits review of 
the project not to any “United States district court”48 but rather to “direct 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
                                                 
43. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856). 
44. Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
45. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). 
46. Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). 
47. Id. at 1431 (citing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 
§§ 201-206, 87 Stat. 576 (1973)). 
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (2012). 
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Circuit.”49 It is possible to argue that, because judicial review may only 
be had in the District of Columbia, this restriction poses a procedural due 
process issue of inadequate access to the courts or an equal protection 
concern of disparate impact upon those who reside at great distances 
from our nation’s capital. However, such arguments seem unlikely to 
prevail. 
III. THE “INHERENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS” OF THE PRESIDENT 
 Unlike the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, the Keystone XL pipeline 
proposes to cross an international boundary. Under color and force of 
Executive Order No. 13,337, this crossing implicates the “inherent 
foreign affairs powers” of the President. Though there is little textual 
support for this principle to be found in the Constitution itself, a certain 
degree of power in the arena of foreign affairs has long been settled to 
vest in the executive in what are known as the “inherent foreign affairs 
powers” of the President.50 Perhaps the earliest, and certainly the best-
known, expression of sentiment in favor of this power was voiced by 
then-Representative John Marshall. In the House of Representatives on 
March 7, 1800, he referred to the President as “the sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations.”51  
 Certain scholars consider that these powers derive from the 
“Recognition Power” by which the President “shall receive Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers.”52 Others simply point to the “Executive 
Power” clause of the opening section of Article II53 as supportive of a 
presidential power to enter into executive agreements and settlements. 
While the textual origin of the “Recognition Power” may serve to 
enhance the President’s authority in executive dealings to establish or re-
establish relations with a foreign nation, there is no uniformly agreed 
upon textual source of the inherent foreign affairs powers. 
Notwithstanding the explicit provision in Article II for the involvement 
of the Senate in treaty negotiations,54 courts have held that, where the 
                                                 
49. S. 2041, 112th Cong. § 1(f) (2012). 
50. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 34-45 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
51. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (cited in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”). 
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Stating that the President “shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”). 
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foreign affairs powers are properly exercised, executive agreements 
entered into by the President carry the same force of law as a treaty 
obligation consented to by the Senate and are to be accorded the full 
force and protection of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.55 
 For the purposes of this inquiry, it is important to trace the judicial 
trajectory of the foreign affairs powers over a fifty-year period beginning 
in the 1930s. The seminal Supreme Court case recognizing the foreign 
affairs powers came in 1936 in the case of United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.56 In that case, an arms manufacturer challenged an 
order issued by President Roosevelt who, acting within a clear statutory 
grant of power from Congress, had banned the export of arms to certain 
South American nations involved in a border and natural resources 
dispute. Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority and enthusiastically 
upheld the presidential order. In an opinion weighed heavily by his 
political theory of international relations, Justice Sutherland wrote that 
the Constitution governed only the power differential between states and 
the federal government. He opined that foreign affairs powers could not 
have been conveyed to the President by states that never possessed them 
but rather that the foreign affairs powers vested directly in the federal 
executive from the Crown at the time of the Declaration of 
Independence.57 In his view, there was therefore nothing offensive to the 
Constitution in the President’s broad exercise of foreign affairs powers; 
the opinion suggests, without so stating, that the President might have 
acted properly even in the absence of the statutory grant.58 Curtiss-
Wright has never been overruled and continues to be cited by those who 
favor the robust presidential exercise of foreign affairs powers. However 
its precise stare decisis effect remains somewhat uncertain.  
 Three years prior to the Curtiss-Wright decision, in 1933, President 
Roosevelt entered into the Litvinov Agreement (or Litvinov Assignment) 
with the leadership of the Soviet Union. The agreement called for the 
prominent Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov to be involved in 
negotiations.59 Under the terms of this agreement, the United States 
formally recognized the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union transferred 
to the United States its interest in a Russian insurance company, which 
was situated in New York and had been nationalized in 1918 and 1919.60 
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The assets of the insurance company were to be used to pay claims of the 
United States and its citizens against the Soviet Union.61 
 In a pair of cases that reached the Supreme Court after the Curtiss-
Wright decision, the Court upheld the executive agreement and wrote 
that because it was not a treaty, Senate approval was not required. While 
New York’s courts had refused to enforce the Litvinov Agreement, the 
Court wrote in United States v. Belmont that “in the case of all 
international compacts and agreements . . . complete power over 
international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot 
be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several 
states.”62 Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in United States v. Pink 
that “[a] treaty is a ‘Law of the Land’ under the supremacy clause [of 
Article VI] of the Constitution. Such international compacts and 
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity.”63 During 
the 1940s and 1950s, Senator Bricker proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would have eliminated the use of executive 
agreements.64 No such amendment was ever enacted by Congress. 
 There are two cases of particular implication in the “inherent 
foreign affairs power” inquiry as to the presidential permitting power of 
Executive Order 13,337, which surfaced in the decades after the close of 
the Second World War. These cases are significant because of the direct 
manner in which the courts addressed the relative constitutional powers 
of the executive and Congress vis-à-vis various foreign commercial 
interests. These two cases are United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.65, and 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Henry Kissinger, Sec’y of State.66  
 In Guy W. Capps, the federal government brought suit against a 
private businessman for breach of a contract. The businessman had 
entered into the contract in order to comply with the terms of an 
executive agreement previously reached between the United States and 
Canada.67 Alarmed by several years of record potato crops in the United 
States, the government pledged itself to a system of price supports in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended by the Agricultural Act of 
1948,68 under which it would purchase from eligible potato growers all 
table stock and seed potatoes that could not be sold commercially at a 
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parity price. In furtherance of this policy the United States, through the 
Acting Secretary of State, entered into an executive agreement with the 
Canadian Ambassador whereby the Canadian government would only 
grant licenses for the export of potatoes to the United States, where the 
exporter could give firm evidence of orders for seed potatoes and where 
the importer gave an assurance that the potatoes would not be diverted 
for table stock purposes. The district court entered judgment for the 
defendant, finding insufficient evidence that a breach of his assurance 
not to divert potatoes had in fact occurred.69  
 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on 
different grounds, looking rather to the validity of the executive 
agreement itself.70 Within the Agricultural Act of 1948, Congress had 
created a procedure by which the President could impose limitations on 
imports where it was thought that such imports would render ineffective 
or materially interfere with the price support program.71 Specifically, the 
statute empowered the President to “cause an immediate investigation” 
and to “impose such . . . quantitative limitations . . . as he finds and 
declares shown by such investigation to be necessary.”72 The Fourth 
Circuit found that the President had caused no such investigation, and 
that “[t]here was no pretense of complying with the requirements of this 
statute.”73 The court quoted the famous concurring opinion of Justice 
Jackson in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: “When 
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers.”74 The court then opined that 
“[i]mports from a foreign country are foreign commerce subject to 
regulation, so far as this country is concerned, by Congress alone.”75 
 The Supreme Court affirmed, but it did so by reinstating the 
judgment of the district court and declining to address the validity of the 
executive agreement.76 In its opinion, the Supreme Court wrote that 
“there is no occasion for us to consider the other questions discussed by 
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the Court of Appeals. The decision in this case does not rest upon 
them.”77  
 Consumers Union also concerned the federal government’s efforts 
to control commodity prices.78 As Japanese and European steel producers 
were reborn from the ash of the Second World War and increased their 
production capacities through the 1950s and 1960s, low-cost imports into 
the United States threatened the viability of the American steel industry. 
Officials of President Johnson’s State Department entered into direct 
discussions with the private foreign producer associations from June to 
December 1968. These discussions resulted in the communication of 
voluntary export restraints by which “the Japanese and European 
producer associations stated their intentions to limit steel shipments to 
the United States to specified maximum tonnages for each of the years 
1969, 1970, and 1971.”79  
 The Consumers Union brought suit against the Secretary of State in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia, which entered an order 
declaring that the Executive had no authority to exempt the voluntary 
restraint agreements from the anti-trust laws. The court did however find 
that the Executive could enter into agreements or diplomatic 
arrangements so long as those undertakings did not violate legislation 
regulating foreign commerce. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit found that the actions of the executive in 
securing instant voluntary agreements were not a regulation of foreign 
commerce and as such were not foreclosed to the executive by the 
Constitution.80 
 As in Guy W. Capps, the court dedicated considerable attention to 
the statutory law by which Congress had delegated to the President 
considerable lawmaking power in the area. With the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, Congress granted to the President for a period of five years 
considerable power over the imposition of import restrictions such as 
tariffs and quotas as he deemed necessary to the expansion of America’s 
trading activities.81 This privilege expired in 1967, before the State 
Department entered into negotiations with the foreign steel producer 
associations. However the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit found that the export restrictions were entirely voluntary in nature 
and did not carry the force of law of a tariff or quota. As such, the Court 
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found that the restrictions fell outside the purview of the legislation and 
were not prohibited to the executive.82 The Supreme Court denied the 
Consumers Union petition for a writ of certiorari.83  
  Finally, no overview of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” is 
complete without visiting Dames & Moore v. Regan, Sec’y of the 
Treasury.84 In that case the Supreme Court upheld an executive 
agreement entered into by President Carter with the government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. After the seizure of the American Embassy in 
Tehran and the holding of diplomatic personnel as hostages for more 
than one year, the hostages were finally released in the waning hours of 
the Carter presidency on January 20, 1981, pursuant to an agreement 
entered into on the previous day. Under the terms of the agreement, “[i]t 
is the purpose of [the United States and Iran]. . .to terminate all litigation 
as between the Government of each party and the nationals of the other, 
and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims 
through binding arbitration.”85 On April 28, 1981, the petitioner filed an 
action, alleging that “the actions of the President and the Secretary of the 
Treasury in implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their 
statutory and constitutional powers and . . . were unconstitutional to the 
extent they adversely affect petitioner’s final judgment against the 
Government of Iran . . . and its ability to continue to litigate against the 
Iranian banks.”86 The Supreme Court looked to the International Claims 
Settlement Act of 1949, which was promulgated with the dual purposes 
of facilitating a pending executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia and 
providing a procedure for the facilitation of such future settlements.87 
Emphasizing the narrowness of its decision, the Court wrote that “where, 
as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary 
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our 
country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress 
acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the 
President lacks the power to settle such claims.”88  
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 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established pursuant to the 
agreement entered into by President Carter, continues to adjudicate 
claims to this day.  
A. Executive Order No. 13,337 and the Presidential Permit 
 The history and evolution of the presidential permitting power must 
be examined in order to discern its outermost boundaries. Presidential 
permits are a legal and historical peculiarity that originates in a 
nineteenth-century practice. That practice began when the President 
issued a permit for the landing of a submarine telegraphic cable upon the 
shores of the United States.  
 The first cable from a foreign country arrived from Cuba in 1867 
under the “supposed authority” of an act of Congress of May 5, 1866.89 
The act granted a New York operator a monopoly license for fourteen 
years to lay and operate cables between Florida and the West Indian 
islands.90 The first direct exercise of presidential power came in 1869 
when President Grant refused to allow the landing of a French cable by a 
company to whom the French government had granted a period of 
exclusivity over telegraphic communications by submarine cable 
between France and the United States. After that restriction was lifted, 
“the President’s objection was withdrawn,” and the cable was laid in July 
1869.91 
 From this first grant in 1869, and during the terms of Presidents 
Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, and Harrison, “it was held by 
the Presidents and their Secretaries of State that the Executive has the 
power, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to control the landing, 
and, incidentally, regulate the operation of foreign submarine cables in 
the protection of the interests of this Government and its citizens.”92 In 
August of 1893, then-Secretary of State Gresham briefly reversed this 
trend by declining to consider permit applications and wrote in a letter 
that “[t]here is no federal legislation conferring authority upon the 
President to grant such permission, and in the absence of such 
legislation, Executive action of the character desired would have no 
binding force.”93 However in 1896, after an injunction suit was brought 
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by the then-Attorney General against the landing of a cable without 
federal permission, Judge Lacombe wrote that the consent of the 
“General Government” is required, and that “whether [such consent] 
shall be granted or refused is a political question, and in the absence of 
Congressional action would seem to fall within the province of the 
Executive to decide.”94 In 1898 Acting Attorney General Richards wrote 
to Secretary of State Sherman to express his opinion that “the President 
has the power, in the absence of legislative enactment, to control the 
landing of foreign submarine cables.”95 
 A dispatch to the American Ambassador to Great Britain in 1919 
described the procedure for the granting of permits to land telegraphic 
cables in the United States at that time as follows: 
As there is no legislation of Congress at the present time governing 
the subject, permits to land cables in the United States are granted 
by the President, by virtue of his power as director of the relations 
of the Government with foreign powers, and as Commander in 
Chief of the Army and the Navy. The permit for license is granted 
by the President through the Department of State, after negotiations 
conducted by the Department of State with the diplomatic agents of 
the country of the cable company desiring the permit to land; or in 
case the cable company is an American company, with the officers 
of the company directly.96 
 In 1920, the American Western Union Telegraph Company brought 
a lawsuit against the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy to enjoin 
them from alleged interference, under the guise of the Executive’s power 
to control cable landings in the United States, in its collaborative actions 
with the British Western Telegraph Company. Judge A.N. Hand 
acknowledged the opinion of Judge Lacombe of twenty-five years earlier 
but wrote that: 
[I]n respect to the Western Union, which by the Act of July 24, 
1866 “(supra [14 Stat. 44])” possesses a federal franchise covering a 
business with foreign countries and regulated as to rates by an agen-
cy of the government created by Congress, it seems unreasonable to 
hold that Congress has not occupied the field and legislated so gen-
erally in regard to this defendant that is has withdrawn it from the 
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exercise of executive power in respect to foreign cable connec-
tions.97 
 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment for Western 
Union on March 10, 1921, and on May 27, 1921, Congress enacted the 
so-called “Kellogg Act” to require a written license from the President 
for the landing or operation in the United States of any cable that directly 
or indirectly links the United States to any foreign country. Section 2 of 
the Act provides: 
That the President may withhold or revoke such license when he 
shall be satisfied after due notice and hearing that such action will 
assist in securing rights for the landing or operation of cables in for-
eign countries, or in maintaining the rights or interests of the United 
States or of its citizens in foreign countries, or will promote the se-
curity of the United States, or may grant such license upon such 
terms as shall be necessary to assure just and reasonable rates and 
service in the operation and use of cables so license[d]; Provided, 
That the license shall not contain terms or conditions granting to the 
licensee exclusive rights of landing or of operation in the United 
States . . . .98 
Section 3 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the District Courts of the 
United States to enjoin the landing or operation of a cable in violation of 
its provisions or to compel by injunction the removal thereof.99 By 
executive order issued July 9, 1921, President Warren G. Harding 
“directed that the Secretary of State should receive all applications for 
licenses for the landing or operation of cables and, after obtaining from 
any department of the Government such assistance as he might require, 
should inform the President with regard to the granting or revocation of 
such licenses.”100 
 By executive order issued July 13, 1939, President Roosevelt 
authorized and requested the Federal Power Commission to “receive all 
applications for permits for the construction, operation, maintenance, or 
connection, at the borders of the United States, of facilities for the 
transmission of electric energy between the United States and foreign 
countries, and for the exportation or importation of natural gas to or from 
foreign countries,” and to obtain the recommendations of the Secretaries 
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of State and War before submitting a recommendation to the President.101 
On August 16, 1968, President Johnson delegated similar duties for the 
issuance of oil pipeline permits at our national borders to the State 
Department in Executive Order No. 11,423. 
 Executive Order No. 13,337 was signed by President George W. 
Bush on April 30, 2004, and is the current permutation of the claim to 
executive authority that was first staked by President Lyndon B. Johnson 
in the issuance of August 16, 1968.102 Under Executive Order No. 
13,337:  
the Secretary of State is hereby designated and empowered [as the 
President’s delegate] to receive all applications for Presidential 
permits, as referred to in Executive Order 11,423, as amended, for 
the construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at the bor-
ders of the United States, of facilities for the exportation or importa-
tion of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, or other fuels to or 
from a foreign country.103 
The Order further provides that the Secretary shall “[r]efer the 
application and pertinent information to, and request the views of, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, 
the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the 
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, [and] the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.”104 While the 
Executive Order itself does not refer to any environmental legislation or 
require any impact statements, the State Department provides, on its 
website for permit applicants, that “[i]n processing permit applications, 
the Department reviews compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969.”105  
 After review, the Secretary of State is authorized to grant or deny a 
presidential permit based upon her determination of whether or not the 
proposed project is in the “national interest.”106 Upon notification, should 
any of the government officials listed above formally lodge a 
disagreement with the Secretary’s determination, the Secretary “shall 
refer the application, together with statements of the views of any official 
involved, to the President for consideration and a final decision.”107 
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 Executive Order No. 13,337 opens with an invocation of the 
“authority vested in [President Bush] as President by the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of 
title 3, United States Code.”108 That statutory provision does not confer 
any substantive power to the President from Congress, but only permits 
the President to “designate and empower” the heads of executive 
departments or agencies to perform “any function which is vested in the 
President by law”109 or “which such officer is required or authorized by 
law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other 
action of the President.”110 The source of power to which President 
Bush reaches with this Order is the same to which President Johnson 
turned in 1968 when he opened Executive Order 11,423: “WHEREAS 
the proper conduct of the foreign relations of the United States requires 
that executive permission be obtained . . . .”111 The source to which 
President Bush reaches is the “inherent foreign affairs powers” of the 
President. 
B. The Current Scope of the Presidential Permit Process, While Consti-
tutionally Uncertain, Probably Extends to the Case of the Keystone XL 
Pipeline 
 The outermost boundaries of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” 
in general, and of the presidential permitting power in particular, are 
difficult to discern. In evaluating these powers as to the Keystone XL 
pipeline, three issues rise to the forefront. The first issue concerns 
whether or not the issuance of such a presidential permit is 
constitutionally permissible. The second issue concerns the scope of the 
protections afforded. The third issue concerns the availability of judicial 
review of presidential permit grants and of the attendant environmental 
safeguards. 
1. The Foreign Affairs Powers Do Not Confer in the President the 
Power to Legally Bind the United States in an Agreement with a Pri-
vate Foreign Party 
 At first glance, the entirety of the presidential permitting process as 
exercised toward the Keystone XL pipeline appears to be on 
constitutionally tenuous ground. This is not for the simple reason that it 
might permit an executive action to alter or extinguish rights and 
remedies of American citizens. Such a reading of the law has been 
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conclusively foreclosed by the Supreme Court in the cases that arose out 
of the Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union and in the case of 
Dames & Moore v. Regan that arose out of President Carter’s executive 
settlement with the Government of Iran. During the course of the 
Litvinov Agreement litigation, the Supreme Court specifically rejected 
the due process claims of a petitioner, writing that the executive had not 
extinguished the claims of private creditors against the Soviet 
government but had only subordinated such claims to those of the United 
States.112 The Dames & Moore court similarly suggested the petitioner’s 
recourse to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.113 These sentiments 
are reflected in recent opinions in lawsuits brought by holders of 
Argentina’s defaulted debt where judges have reminded petitioners that 
as against sovereignties, while they may have a right, they may not have 
a remedy.114 
 Rather, the presidential permit power as exercised toward the 
Keystone XL pipeline appears constitutionally tenuous because the 
President is not empowered to enter directly into legally binding 
agreements with a private foreign party. The Roosevelt administration 
entered into the Litvinov Agreement in direct negotiation with a senior 
diplomat of the Soviet government in the establishment of formal 
relations with that country and therefore may have enjoyed the textual 
cover of the President’s Recognition Power. Similarly, the Carter 
administration entered into its agreement with a branch of the Iranian 
government in order to secure the release of American hostages in 
Tehran in a time of high crisis in our relations with that country. Such 
affairs of state fall within the state-to-state form of traditional conduct of 
foreign relations and therefore enjoy robust claims to legitimacy under 
the “inherent foreign affairs powers” as recognized by the Supreme 
Court. 
 In contrast, the presidential permit, while ultimately formalized via 
diplomatic channels, is the result of direct communications and 
negotiations between the executive branch and a private foreign party. 
As such, the presidential permit process is highly factually analogous to 
the Consumers Union case, which remains the law of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and which the Supreme 
Court declined to review at that time.115 In the Consumers Union case, 
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the court upheld the export restrictions agreed to by foreign steel 
producers with the clear admonition that the agreements survived only 
because they were voluntarily reached in good faith and were revocable 
at will. In other words, the court upheld the agreements because they did 
not carry the force of law. The necessary legal implication is that it does 
not fall within the President’s foreign affairs powers to enter into legally 
binding executive agreements with private foreign parties. This finding is 
in stark contrast to the cases of executive agreements with foreign 
sovereignties to which the Supreme Court has accorded the same dignity 
and legal force, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, as 
treaties entered into “with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 
 In the case of the presidential permit issued for Phase I of the 
Keystone Pipeline System and the application currently under review for 
Phase IV, neither the State Department nor the TransCanada Corporation 
has acted under any pretense that the permit is not intended to carry the 
full force and enjoy the full protections of the law in the courts of the 
United States. To be assured of this, one need look no further than the 
case of Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State.116 In that case, 
after the National Resources Defense Council brought suit against the 
Department of State to challenge the adequacy of the EIS prepared 
during the permitting process for Keystone Phase I, TransCanada 
intervened to defend its legal interest in its presidential permit. When the 
judge ruled, he accorded TransCanada’s presidential permit the same 
protections as executive agreements entered into with the Soviet Union, 
Iran, and many other sovereign nations. He ruled the presidential permit 
to be immune from judicial review; he accorded to the presidential 
permit the super-heightened protections of the privileges of the “inherent 
foreign affairs powers” of the President. 
 In the Consumers Union case, Judge Leventhal wrote a spirited 
dissent in which he disagreed with the majority’s factual premise that the 
export restraints agreed to by the foreign steel producers were not 
intended to carry the force of law.117 Judge Leventhal expressed some 
general support for the President’s ability to negotiate with private 
actors: “Presumably, diplomacy ordinarily comprehends negotiation with 
officials of foreign governments, rather than direct negotiations with 
foreign firms as here, but I hesitate to suggest that this constitutes an 
absolute limitation on the President’s authority.”118 The Judge noted what 
the scholar Louis Henkin has referred to as the foreign relations 
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“apparatus,”119 which “gathers a variety of commercial information in 
foreign countries,”120 and continued that “this function inevitably 
involves contact with foreign firms, whether or not their governments are 
a conduit for communication.”121 Nonetheless, he rested his dissent on 
his differences with the majority’s factual premise, necessarily 
acquiescing in its legal findings that the executive cannot legally bind the 
United States in agreements with private actors. 
 While the legal dichotomy that distinguishes the executive’s 
negotiations with state and non-state actors as illustrated in these cases 
seems to demonstrate the impropriety of a presidential grant directly to a 
private entity, to peremptorily reach a conclusion on this basis would 
disregard the particular legal and historical sources of the presidential 
permit power. 
 The earlier practice of the executive conducting negotiations with 
the diplomatic representatives of foreign sovereignties for the permitting 
of submarine telegraphic cables seems a far departure from at least one 
recognized source of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” in the 
Recognition Power of the Constitution. The practice of the executive 
conducting negotiations for the permitting of cross-border pipelines with 
both a foreign nation’s diplomatic representatives and also its captains of 
industry is a further departure still. Nonetheless, the State Department 
permit application materials provide that “[c]onstruction generally 
cannot begin until the U.S. and Canadian governments exchange 
diplomatic notes specifically authorizing the construction.”122 Because of 
this exchange of diplomatic notes, the permit application process is 
distinguishable from the Consumers Union case in which foreign 
industries negotiated directly with the executive without any 
participation of their government whatsoever. This practice of 
negotiation with private foreign parties under the auspices of their 
diplomatic representatives appears to be of the same vein as the earliest 
negotiations for the permitting of submarine telegraphic wires. For this 
reason, the presidential permit process as exercised toward the Keystone 
XL pipeline probably falls within the bounds of the “inherent foreign 
affairs powers” as established by precedent and previously acquiesced in 
by Congress. 
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2. The Foreign Affairs Powers Do Not Confer in the President the 
Power to Approve a Cross-Border Facility’s Extension Beyond the 
Border Crossing Itself 
 Under the terms of the Executive Order, “the Secretary of State is 
hereby designated and empowered to receive all applications for 
Presidential permits, as referred to in Executive Order 11,423, as 
amended, for the construction, connection, operation, or maintenance, at 
the borders of the United States, of facilities for the exportation or 
importation of petroleum, petroleum products, coal, or other fuels to or 
from a foreign country.”123 Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Kerri-Ann Jones, is 
on the record as stating, during a visit to Nebraska, that “[w]e just really 
are responsible for the part that comes over the border and goes to the 
first valve.”124 This statement is consistent with the language of a 
different presidential permit, cited in Sierra Club v. Clinton, in which a 
permit was granted for “[a] 36-inch diameter pipeline extending from the 
United States-Canada border . . . up to and including the first mainline 
shut-off valve or pumping station in the United States.”125  
 In light of the cross-border context, the language of the permit and 
the statement of Assistant Secretary of State Jones are consistent with the 
history of the presidential permitting process in which permits were 
granted for the landing of submarine telegraphic cables. Such “landing 
permits” are, by definition, restricted to the utility’s point of entry into 
the United States. In the case of such telegraphic cable landing permits, it 
appears that the permitting power extended at most over the territorial 
waters of the United States through which the cable passed. In one early 
instance a permit was granted for a Canadian cable to traverse 
approximately eighty miles of U.S. territory before re-entering Canada, 
but that permit was expressly understood to be revocable at will.126 
 The presidential permitting power therefore appears to be restricted 
to the approval or disapproval of the physical border crossing itself. This 
limitation is in line with the considerable deference that has been granted 
to individual states in determining the route that the pipeline will take 
across their territory. This deference explains, to an extent, the particular 
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solicitude for the concerns of Nebraska contained within Senate Bill 
2041 as to its sensitive Sand Hills and Ogallala Aquifer.127 
 Despite this clear limitation on the scope of the permit, the State 
Department has begun to prepare an EIS for the entire proposed route of 
the pipeline. This raises constitutional questions of the judicial 
reviewability of such an EIS, and the federal courts do not speak with 
one voice on this issue. 
3. A President’s Decision to Grant a Permit and an Environmental 
Impact Statement Commissioned by the Department of State Might 
Be Immune from Judicial Review  
 In 2009, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a 
lawsuit against the Department of State in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the Department’s grant of 
a presidential permit for the construction of Phase I of the Keystone 
Pipeline System. In Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, in 
which TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP, intervened as a defendant, 
the NRDC alleged that the State Department had violated NEPA by 
issuing a presidential permit on the basis of an inadequate assessment of 
environmental impacts.128 Upon motion by the defendants, the claim was 
dismissed on the pleadings for the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.129 
 In the complaint, the plaintiffs did not challenge the inherent 
constitutional power of the President to grant permits for trans-border 
facilities. Rather, the plaintiffs alleged that because in that case the final 
decision was rendered by the Secretary of State without the President’s 
involvement, it was not an executive decision but was rather an 
administrative one and was, as such, subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Judge Richard J. Leon dismissed this 
argument, finding that the Secretary of State acted as the President’s 
delegate under Executive Order No. 13,337 and that the decision 
therefore enjoyed the deference of one made by the President himself. 
Judge Leon wrote that “Defendants have amply documented the long 
history of Presidents exercising their inherent foreign affairs power to 
issue cross-border permits, even in the absence of any congressional 
authorization,” and continued to find that “[w]here, as here, the President 
… delegates his inherent constitutional authority to a subordinate agency 
and that authority is not limited or otherwise governed by statute, the 
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agency’s exercise of that discretionary authority on behalf of the 
President is tantamount to presidential action and cannot be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.”130  Though there is no higher court authority as to 
challenges of presidential permits issued under Executive Order No. 
13,337, Judge Leon did take note of the case of Tulare County v. Bush, 
where  the court dismissed a NEPA claim “because NEPA requires 
agency action, and the action in question is an extension of the 
President’s action.”131 In a companion opinion handed down the same 
day, the District Court for the District of South Dakota reached 
substantially the same result;132 it appears that the South Dakota court 
awaited the ruling on this constitutionally charged issue from the District 
of Columbia court before handing down its own ruling.  
 Similarly, in the District of Minnesota, the court upheld the grant of 
a presidential permit against a constitutional challenge.133 However, the 
deference accorded to the presidential permitting power in that court was 
less than absolute. Departing from the rulings of the District of Columbia 
and South Dakota Districts, Judge Frank of the District of Minnesota 
ruled that a State Department issuance of an FEIS is not an executive or 
presidential action, but rather is a final agency action subject to judicial 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act.134 In deciding this case, 
Judge Frank made note of an Eighth Circuit case,135 which in turn cited 
the Supreme Court for the proposition that “an agency's decision to issue. 
. . an [EIS] is a ‘final agency action’ permitting immediate judicial 
review under NEPA” and the APA.136 Judge Frank wrote of the South 
Dakota and District of Columbia opinions that “the Court respectfully 
disagrees with those decisions insofar as they hold that any action taken 
by the State Department pursuant to an executive order, and in particular 
the preparation of an EIS for a major federal action, is not subject to 
judicial review under the APA.”137 This division of authority remains 
unresolved. Executive Order No. 13,337 does not mention NEPA or an 
                                                 
130. Id. at 113. 
131. Tulare County v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). 
132. Sisseton v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D.S.D. 2009) (holding that the 
grant of the permit is a presidential action not subject to judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
133. Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2010). 
134. Id. at 1157. 
135. Id. at 1156 (citing Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 
2006)). 
136. Ohio Forestry Ass’n. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). 
137. Sierra Club, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 n. 3. 
150 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 3:123 
EIS.138 It is only in the State Department’s implementing practices and 
regulations that the Department elects to perform an EIS for projects for 
where a presidential permit application is submitted.139 It is not clear 
how the Sierra Club court would have ruled if the State Department 
instead performed no EIS at all. 
 As noted, the State Department’s requirement of an “exchange of 
diplomatic notes” likely satisfies the prohibition against binding 
agreements entered into directly with private foreign parties. However 
the exact scope of the protections afforded by a presidential permit to 
facilities that reach beyond the border crossing and the judicial 
reviewability of attendant NEPA safeguards remain highly unsettled. 
C. Congress is Constitutionally Authorized to Unilaterally Regulate 
Cross-Border Facilities 
 Though difficult to evaluate in light of the uncertain contours of the 
“inherent foreign affairs powers” as to the presidential permitting 
process, it appears that the exercise of the power as to the Keystone XL 
pipeline falls within the bounds established by precedent and previously 
acquiesced in by Congress. However, the “inherent foreign affairs 
powers” of the President are not the only implication of the Keystone XL 
pipeline’s crossing of an international boundary that set it apart from the 
earlier Trans-Alaska Pipeline. In TAPAA itself Congress does not clearly 
establish the constitutionally enumerated power under which the Act is 
brought, writing only that “it is the intent of the Congress to exercise its 
constitutional powers to the fullest extent in the authorizations and 
directions herein made.”140 At least one observer has suggested that 
Congress acted under color of its Article IV power to control public 
lands.141  
 Legislation brought to authorize or otherwise control the cross-
border facilities contemplated by Executive Order 13,337 could be 
brought under the broad congressional power “to regulate Commerce 
with foreign nations,”142 and this is indeed the source to which Senator 
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Hoeven reached in introducing Senate Bill 2041.143 When Executive 
Order 13,337 was signed into force by President George W. Bush in 
2004, the earlier language empowering the President to grant permits 
only “to the extent that congressional authorization is not required”144 
had been removed.145 While this removal may be an accurate reflection 
of the entrenchment of the presidential permitting power by 
congressional inaction and acquiescence, the constitutional power of 
Congress, where properly exercised, cannot be waived or amended in 
time. 
 The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reveals the Commerce 
Clause to be perhaps the most expansive of the enumerated powers 
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. The Court has written that 
“[t]he power to regulate commerce with foreign nations is expressly 
conferred upon Congress, and being an enumerated power is complete in 
itself, acknowledging no limitations other than those prescribed in the 
Constitution.”146 In referring to the power as “exclusive and plenary,”147 
the Court expounded that “[a]s an exclusive power, its exercise may not 
be limited, qualified or impeded to any extent by state action.”148 In a 
2006 opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court 
wrote that the Supreme Court has “never struck down an act of Congress 
as exceeding its powers to regulate foreign commerce.”149 
 There may be some areas which are uniquely and exclusively within 
the constitutional purview of the presidency so as to make them 
impervious to a congressional wresting of control. In light of the 
expansive reach that the courts have attached to the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, the control of cross-border facilities embodied in the presidential 
permitting power is not among them. 
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD ACT WITHIN ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO 
ESTABLISH A TRANSPARENT PERMIT PROCESSING REGIME AND TO 
ENSURE ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ALL 
CROSS-BORDER FACILITIES 
 The purpose of the inquiry thus far is to firmly establish that 
Congress is at will to do as it pleases with regard to cross-border 
facilities such as the Keystone XL pipeline. As demonstrated by the 
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treatment of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act in the courts, 
Congress is free to exempt a particular project from previously enacted 
environmental safeguards and to limit the scope of judicial review. The 
jurisprudence of the Foreign Commerce Clause abundantly confirms 
that, regardless of past exercises of presidential permitting power under 
color of the “inherent foreign affairs powers” of the President, Congress 
may legislate in the field, even to the point of occupying it entirely, at 
will.  Simply in the name of efficiency, there is great value to be had in 
the elimination of the legal uncertainty that currently envelops the 
permitting process.  At present, Congress has not spoken as to the precise 
outer limit of the executive’s power in the granting of presidential 
permits for trans-border oil pipelines. As Napoleon is believed to have 
said, where the law is not conclusively settled the tools belong to the man 
that can use them. 
 Legislation targeted to entirely remove the consideration of the 
Keystone XL pipeline from the purview of the presidency stands to 
worsen rather than to improve the quality of environmental protection. 
This is the case with the now-dormant Senate Bill 2041. Because the Bill 
would mandate acceptance of a potentially flawed EIS and would restrict  
the scope of judicial review, the bill would diminish the public’s faith in 
the ability of Congress to ensure adequate environmental protection and 
to keep the doors of our courts open to citizens who seek redress. 
Additionally, by targeting a specific project, Senate Bill 2041 makes for 
poor environmental and public policy. Rather than reducing the 
uncertainty that presently characterizes the presidential permit process, 
the bill would increase uncertainty by introducing the possibility that any 
permits pending in the future may be co-opted by a fickle Congress. 
Senate Bill 2041 would not abolish the presidential permit process but 
rather leave it intact, thereby subjecting future projects to confusing ad 
hoc decision making from two branches of government giving multiple 
answers to the same question. 
 To prevent this confusion and increase efficiency, Congress should 
enact legislation to establish a transparent and consistent permit-
processing regime for cross-border infrastructure projects. To accomplish 
this goal, Congress should eliminate the uncertainty that currently 
envelops the presidential permit process by either abolishing it entirely or 
by affirming that the presidential permit power is restricted to the 
physical border crossing. Additionally,  Congress should remove grants 
of permits that extend deep into the interior of the United States and also 
the appropriate attendant environmental safeguards from a space in 
which they might presently enjoy immunity from court scrutiny as within 
the scope of “presidential” actions. Congress should include in such 
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legislation robust provisions for the application of NEPA standards to all 
permit applications and for the ability of affected citizens to challenge 
the adequacy of such environmental safeguards in an open court of the 
United States. 
 Currently, Congress remains free to override otherwise uniform 
procedures in legislation targeted to a specific project. Some might argue 
that even if Congress were to establish uniform and consistent 
procedures for the evaluation of cross-border permit applications, these 
procedures may have limited effect given that Congress remains, as it is, 
perpetually free to disregard its own rules. Nonetheless, the 
establishment of a permit-processing regime is an essential first step. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The presidential permit power and the “inherent foreign affairs 
powers” of the President are enveloped in legal uncertainty. The lessons 
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline tell us that Congress has the power to act 
with force in the authorization and regulation of certain infrastructure 
projects.  In the case of the Keystone XL pipeline, Congress, should it 
choose to act, is supreme over the presidency.  Here, Congress can avail 
itself of the expansive grant of power that is the Foreign Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution. 
 However this unbounded power of Congress must be exercised 
judiciously.  Congress should enact legislation either to clarify the 
historical truth that the President’s permit-granting power is constrained 
to the border crossing itself or to do away with the presidential permit 
process entirely. Such legislation should clearly establish that pipelines, 
including those that arrive via the international boundaries of the United 
States, are subject to the full force of the NEPA regulatory regime, and 
should expressly provide for the judicial reviewability of the adequacy of 
all environmental impact statements prepared within the permitting 
process. In this way, Congress can reduce legal confusion in this area. 
Most importantly, Congress can do away with a peculiarity of legal 
history that has paradoxically afforded a foreign energy infrastructure 
company immunity from certain domestic environmental protection 
laws.   
  By abrogating its earlier acquiescence in the power of the President, 
Congress will ensure adequate and proper environmental and judicial 
review of cross-border projects moving forward into the future. 
